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Abstract: 
This study aims at uncovering the discourses in Donald Trump’s announcement speech and their 
relation to his campaign slogan Make America Great Again. Through a thorough analysis of his 
speech, we have identified thematic categories and used critical discourse studies (CDS), to 
denaturalise the discourses he produces and reproduces in a socio-cultural and socio-political 
context. Our method of Critical Discourse Analysis is based on Fairclough, complemented by 
Wodak, Richardson and van Dijk, to create a framework capable of analysing the case at hand. In 
addition to the announcement speech, we have found multiple examples to add perspective and 
create a more holistic picture of Trump’s rhetorical practices. Our findings include right-wing 
populist, neoliberal and even arguably fascist discourses, all rooted in Trumps strategy of blaming 
the Other.  
Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), Donald Trump, 
Make America Great Again, Fascism, Right-Wing Populism, Neoliberalism, Election, Wodak, van 
Dijk, Richardson & Fairclough.  
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Introduction  
Donald J. Trump is currently the presumptive Republican nominee for the United States’ 
presidency. He is a controversial candidate due to his political inexperience and 
flamboyant personality. Trump has been called a populist (Link 1), a racist (Link 2) and a 
hypocritical sexist (Link 3). He has been compared to fascists (Link 4) and labelled 
everything from crazy (Link 5) to genius (Link 6) to ridiculous (Link 7). We believe that 
Donald Trump will probably continue to make headlines worldwide while he has left the 
Republican Party divided and perplex (Link 8). After announcing his candidacy for the 
2016 United States presidency, Trump’s campaign took off, quickly making him the 
frontrunner for the GOP (Link 9). 
Our motivation for this project rests upon a collective fascination of the political 
phenomenon Trump. Our fascination originates from both critical and acclaiming articles 
concerning Trump in popular media, and we want to grasp exactly how he 
communicatively positions himself in relation to his audience. Our initial interest was 
focused around his person and brand, but we quickly realised, that the task of 
understanding and analysing the brand of Trump is simply too vast. Our interest thus 
shifted to the political branding and campaign of Trump. This however, proved less 
relevant, way too dependent on political science, and far from our preferred field of 
Critical Discourse Studies. We therefore decided to shift focus and turn towards his 
slogan; Make America Great Again. This slogan has previously been used by prominent 
republican presidents and candidates such as Ronald Reagan (Link 10) and it has now 
been adopted by Trump. 
Our point of departure will be his announcement speech given on June 16th 2015. The 
speech ends with the words; “But if I get elected president I will bring it back bigger and 
better and stronger than ever before, and we will make America great again” (Appendix A, 
14:15). We thus argue that the narrative of the slogan is constructed within the 
announcement speech and we are going to thoroughly analyse the speech through a 
critical lens. This project aims at revealing and denaturalising the discourses and ideology 
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present in the announcement speech, and thus the tools with which he constructs his 
narrative of the slogan. We want to understand and explain these discourses. Where they 
come from, how they assist in creating a specific narrative, and how the narrative of the 
slogan (re)produces power relations. 
Trump is potentially going to be one of the most powerful men on earth, which is why we 
deem it of the utmost importance to understand and denaturalise the ideologies, 
discourses and power relations he constructs his narrative upon. What we are going to 
investigate is how the narrative of the slogan is being constructed in the announcement 
speech of Donald J. Trump. To do this we will attempt at answering questions such as 
how the narrative (re)produces discursive power, which ideologies and discourses can be 
denaturalised and thus which power relations can be revealed, and which discursive tools 
is used in the construction of his narrative. Our problem statement is thus;  
How is the narrative of the slogan constructed in the announcement speech of Donald J. 
Trump? 
To do the above we will investigate the following hypothesis through analysis; we wish to 
show that Donald Trump is using scapegoating as part of his rhetoric, and is thus blaming 
a constructed Other as the reason to the downfall of America. 
 
Donald J. Trump  
Working in his father’s company during his studies, Trump became familiar with the world 
of construction and real estate development. As a young teenager he was sent to the 
New York Military Academy where he succeeded both academically and socially. He later 
attended Fordham University, but transferred and ultimately graduated with a degree in 
economy from Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania in 1968 (Link 
11). Seeing great potential in the real estate business in New York, Trump got involved in 
lucrative building projects in the early 70s. During the next decades he grew to be the 
most famous and reputed developer in the city, paving the way for his future business 
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empire (Link 12). His participation in the NBC reality series ‘The Apprentice’ boosted his 
celebrity status and made him a nationwide household name (Link 12).  
Several times during the last three decades, Trump has considered entering the 
presidential race, latest in 2012 (Link 13), however only actually campaigning for a 
nomination in 2000 for the Reform Party (Link 13). His political orientation has changed 
several times as well as his stands on a number of policies (Link 14; 15). Over the past 
two decades, he listed himself as a registered voter as Republican, Independence Party, 
Democrat, Republican again, and ‘decline to state’ (Link 13). Despite his Democratic 
background and despite his predominant donations for Democratic candidates before 
2011 (Link 16), Trump now labels himself “very conservative” on several areas (Link 17).  
Trump has spent years in his attempt to become a respected part of the Republican 
Party, where he has faced doubt and ridicule numerous times (Link 18). Dating back to 
2011, he started taking part in more political events where he addressed his future key 
issues and got involved with pollsters to test his electability (Link 18). After his decision 
not to run in 2012 for the Republicans, he shifted his focus to supporting Republican Mitt 
Romney’s campaign (Link 13). Trump was met with scepticism and only with a great deal 
persistency, he convinced Romney that he should receive and announce his 
endorsement and his donations (Link 18). All along, people arguably thought he did it 
entirely for the attention, which would pass soon enough. In the Republican party, 
Trump’s efforts to show his eagerness to fund candidates and aide their campaigning, 
went by more or less unnoticed or directly ignored and downplayed (Link 18). In early 
2015 however, Trump began seeking direct advice on actual campaigning and costs, and 
made trips to early voting states (Link 18). Yet, even after his announcement speech and 
his early lead in the race, neither his rivals nor the media gave him much recognition. It 
was not until the end of 2015, when he upheld his lead, that he gained status as a serious 
contester (Link 18).  
Since then, Trump has continued his impressive form and has continued gaining 
momentum throughout the primary elections. After winning Super Tuesday, he has 
continued to win landslide after landslide, resulting in his main opponent, Ted Cruz, 
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quitting the race (Link 19). He currently holds 1,103 delegates, versus Cruz’ 549 
delegates, and is the presumptive candidate of the GOP (Link 20) as he is currently 
completely unopposed, despite an apparent lack of support from the GOP. All signs point 
toward him becoming the Republican candidate who will run for President of the United 
States of America come November.  
 
Theory 
In order to analyse the announcement speech of Trump, our chosen approach will 
generally be Critical Discourse Analysis. Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) or Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) has no singular specific theoretical framework or methodology 
(van Dijk 1993, 2001; Fairclough 2001; Wodak 2013, 2015). CDA has worked its way from 
the critical Frankfurt School into language and discourse studies (van Dijk 1993). It has 
several different approaches and according to van Dijk (1993, 2001), CDA focuses on the 
uncovering of power abuse, inequality, and dominance, and is meant as a tool for 
multidisciplinary analysis of structures through which discourses are produced and 
reproduced in a socio-political context. Fairclough (1989, 1995, 1997) argues that the 
main task of CDA is to reveal and denaturalise dominant and naturalised ideology through 
analysis of micro-events. This denaturalisation is important, as uncovering social 
structures through discourses on a macro-level becomes possible through micro-events. 
The uncovering is possible through three levels; (a) analysis of text, (b) analysis of 
processes of text production, consumption and distribution and (c) socio-cultural (or 
socio-political) analysis of the discursive (micro-)event (Fairclough 1995). To conduct 
analyses of the micro-events, linguistic analysis containing the use of lexical analysis, 
naming, predications, modality, presupposition and rhetorical tropes (including 
hyperboles, metaphors and neologisms) is convenient (Richardson 2006). As we are 
navigating the socio-political field, our point of departure will be political discourse 
(Wilson 2001; van Dijk 1997). When investigating power relations and dominance it is 
important to note that power relations are inherently discursive according to Wodak & 
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Fairclough (1997) and van Dijk (2001). Power, according to van Dijk (1993), is the ability to 
control others through discourse. However, this enactment of power does not take place 
only within the text, which is why we must always be aware of the socio-cultural or socio-
political context, with our social constructivist approach (van Dijk 1993). The theory of 
cognitive pragmatics further offers us a preliminary step of discourse comprehension 
(Bara 2010), which entails the locating of inductive and deductive inferences (Singer & Lea 
2012). Through this, we are studying the construction of validated reality within a specific 
context. We are thus setting out to investigate social change through change in 
discourse, and this is possible through texts (or micro-events) in relation to other social 
processes (Wodak 2015). Wodak (2015:7) agrees with Fairclough that the challenge lies 
within; “(...) simultaneously addressing (a) relations between discourse and other social 
elements (...) and (b) relations between social events/texts and (...) social reality: social 
practices and social structures”. Our challenge thus resides in the process of arguing 
what and why the discursive findings of the slogan mean for social reality.  
 
Delimitation 
Through our epistemological stand of social constructivism, it is possible to argue that 
the different presidential candidates represent different perceptions, attitudes and 
ideological standpoints. It is therefore presumable that the different candidates represent 
a wide variety of different individual perceptions of key concepts such as ‘democracy’, 
‘tolerance’, ‘welfare’ and ‘labour’. This could have been interesting to study further 
through a cultural discourse analysis. To create said cultural discourse analysis it would 
have been ideal to include the theory of Donal Carbaughs of radiants of meaning (Link 
21). This includes theory of how the individual is affected by its cultural context, and how 
this is shown linguistically. As previously stated we have chosen to conduct a critical 
discourse analysis because this approach has shown to be the most beneficial when it 
comes to the revelation of power relations within the announcement speech according to 
our hypothesis.  
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Methodology 
Our analytical strategy will be based on the aforementioned ideas of what CDA and CDS 
entails. We will (a) build a linear and linguistic analysis of the text in order to locate 
essential themes and thus create thematic categories (b) conduct further linguistic and 
contextual analysis of the categories (c) investigate the discursive representation of the 
categories (d) discuss the social practices, structures and context of the texts and lastly 
(e) discuss our findings on a theoretical level in order to give an attempt at specifying 
which discourses, power relations and ideology is (re)produced by Trump. 
Van Dijk (1997) makes an important point in relation to doing CDA and CDS. Any Critical 
Discourse Analyst must take a socio-political stand. Our stance on the topic of Trump, is 
that he, through the narrative of the slogan, produces discourses and power relations 
with which he seeks to dominate and control his audience. He is controlling these power 
relations and we wish to denaturalise the discourses, ideologies and social structures 
they are built upon. The final steps of our analyses are based on Fairclough’s (1995) three 
dimensional model of discourse comprehension, i.e. trying to understand how the 
discursive practice within the text relates to social practice; 
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The final part of our methodological approach originates in Wodak (2015) and Dyers & 
Wankah (2012) and surrounds the idea of a scapegoating hypothesis. Dyer & Wankah 
(2012) asserts that it is possible to reveal scapegoating through the location of three 
discourses; xenophobic statements, and the discourses exceptionalism and indigeneity. 
We are looking for scapegoating as Wodak (2015:4) argues that such scapegoating 
rhetoric “(...) belong to the necessary ‘toolkit’ of right-wing populist rhetoric”. The 
scapegoating hypothesis can be validated through the investigation of the construction of 
the Other throughout the text. Our hypothesis is as follows;  
Donald Trump is using scapegoating as part of his rhetoric, and is thus blaming a 
constructed Other as the reason to the downfall of America. 
 
Methodological Pitfalls    
Fairclough has received a great amount of critique regarding the last aspect of the 
framework about social practice, because he claims that the analysis of this third step 
should be conducted through social theory. However, Fairclough does not directly 
specify exactly which social theory is best suited for this task. We argue that we meet this 
critique by implementing complementary theory within our analytic strategy. These 
complementary elements rest upon the theoretical foundation offered by Richardson and 
van Dijk. Furthermore, we argue that the potential lack of social theory relating to the 
analysis of the text’s social practice is being met by the appliance of the theoretical 
influences of Wodak, Dyers & Wankah and lastly Preston & Silke. 
When conducting our analysis, we are aware of the presence of a potential confirmation 
bias (Link 22). In this case a confirmation bias is understood within the field of cognitive 
science, as a potential tendency evident in the location of patterns of repeated meaning 
that will make it possible to validate a set hypothesis. The confirmation bias therefore 
refers to the representation of a potential error in the inductive reasoning of the data 
gathered and the later validation and confirmation of the project’s hypothesis. Whilst 
being aware of this potential underlying presence of a confirmation bias we argue that its 
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presence will be deemed methodologically irrelevant due to our own methodological 
approach to the analysis. We argue that our analytic strategy will make it possible to 
maintain a holistic understanding of the text, and by this assure that no presuppositional 
reflections and choices will be conducted on our behalf, and thereby eliminate the 
presence of the potential confirmation bias. 
 
The announcement speech 
In this chapter we will go through the announcement speech of Donald Trump, firstly we 
will conduct a linear analysis to give a straightforward comprehension of the speech in its 
entirety. The announcement speech was held on June 16th 2015 in Trump Tower, New 
York.  
First and foremost, we have decided to conduct a readability analysis for overall 
measures. This places the speech lower than a regular ‘easy’ text, considering both 
length and difficulty of words and sentences. In a scale ranging from 1-100, where 60-80 
is considered easy, the speech scores 81.6, equivalent to a 6th grade level (Flesh 1949). 
This could indicate an attempt to allow the general public to comprehend Trump’s 
problematizations. In this sense, Trump decreases the gap between himself, the 
intellectual, and the general public through the use of simpler linguistics. We argue that 
this is an attempt to disguise the inequality and downplay the power relation between 
them. Whether it is an intentional strategy or not, he creates an understanding in the 
audience of him as an equal, as opposed to him as a dominant and manipulative power 
(van Dijk 2001). 
 
  
12 
Linear analysis 
The following section is an initial, linear analysis of Trumps entire speech, dedicated to 
identifying which thematic categories are the most significant throughout. 
The very first section of Trump’s speech works as an introduction, thanking the crowd for 
their presence and their impressive numbers. Trump then proceeds to criticise the other 
candidates, telling an unflattering story about them not being able to work out an air-
conditioner and concluding that they would not be able to beat ISIS (Appendix A, 1:7). 
After criticising his opponents, he starts summing up some of the problems he sees the 
America facing. The following section gives a good impression of how Trump addresses 
their problems; 
“Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories anymore. We used to have 
victories, but we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody saw us beating, 
let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time”. 
(Appendix A, 1:9) 
The first thing worth noticing about this quote is his use of naming. Trump paints a clear 
picture ‘us’ against ‘them’ as he brings up China for the first time. He depicting himself 
and the crowd being in the same boat and also a picture of China as an adversary that 
has beaten them over and over. Whether it be China, Mexico or even Japan, he maintains 
a clear division of us and them throughout his speech. However, he is not like the rest of 
America, as he clearly states that he ‘beats them all the time’. What is also interesting 
about the quote is the presupposition implied when he says ‘they don’t have victories 
anymore’, thus presupposing that the United States used to have them. 
The following section of the speech concentrates on foreign nations and the threat to the 
American economy they represent is a very big part of his speech. He concludes that 
America has become a ‘dumping ground for everybody else’s problems’ and gives 
examples of how this is done. The clearest example of this is when he claims Mexico is 
sending criminals, rapists and drugs to the US (Appendix A, 1:18) and how they are killing 
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the American economy (Appendix A, 1:16). Calling them rapists and criminals is also a 
good example of the type of predication Trump uses. 
The next section of his speech addresses the military threats facing the US in the shape 
of Islamic Terrorism and the destabilisation of the Middle East (Appendix A, 2:4). While he 
claims that Iran is on the verge of taking over Iraq, he talks about the failed war in Iraq, 
how it has cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars (Appendix A, 2:5). Once again, 
he names a specific foreign threat, this time in the form of Iran, and presents ‘them’ as a 
clear opponent of ‘us’. He returns to the US economy and the bad state of things 
domestically. This gives us a bit of insight into what Trump wants to achieve as president 
besides strengthening the military (Appendix A, 2:1) and beating China. 
“Last quarter, it was just announced our gross domestic product— a sign of strength, 
right? But not for us. It was below zero. Whoever heard of this? It’s never below zero”.  
(Appendix A, 2:13) 
Trump directly states that he views the national GDP as a sign of strength, effectively 
calling the US weak. He paints a grim picture of the US as being on a downward spiral, 
while the competition grows stronger by stealing from them. 
Of course, all this does not happen by itself and Trump now starts to go after the 
domestic political establishment. He displays the incompetence of the current 
government by talking about the expensive Obamacare website (Appendix A, 3:1) and the 
devastating effects of Obamacare which are hurting American patients (Appendix A, 
3:27). His ‘Fellow Republicans’ are presented as confused (Appendix A, 3:10) and as men 
who refuse to address the real issues such as jobs and China (Appendix A, 3: 12). All in 
all, politicians as a group are put in a negative light throughout this part of his speech. 
“Well, you need somebody, because politicians are all talk, no action. Nothing’s gonna 
get done. They will not bring us— believe me— to the promised land. They will not”. 
(Appendix A, 3:5) 
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This time he is creating a clear distinction between himself and the political establishment 
by basically stating that he is not a politician. Politicians, according to Trump, are 
‘controlled fully’ by lobbyists, donors and special interests (Appendix A, 4:1) and they 
therefore only work for some people rather than for the country (Appendix A, 4:3). He 
states on several occasions that what America needs is someone to restore it to its 
former greatness (Appendix A, 4:18) and that they need someone capable of doing so. 
“So ladies and gentlemen...I am officially running... for president of the United States, 
and we are going to make our country great again”.  
(Appendix A, 4:27) 
He creates a direct link between him being elected president and America being restored 
to its former greatness. He states as a fact that he will be ‘the greatest jobs president that 
God ever created’, by bringing back jobs and money from overseas (Appendix A, 5:3). 
The fact that the politicians are even allowing this to happen sets him up for his next 
berating of the domestic political establishment. He uses a lot of negative predications, 
calling the leaders and politicians stupid (Appendix A, 5:9), going after the negotiation 
skills of Barack Obama (Appendix A, 5:13) and calling the politicians in office ‘hacks’ who 
essentially bought their way into power (Appendix A, 5:22). The bad negotiation skills of 
the establishment represent one of the biggest challenges to Trump. He tells stories of 
how manufacturers are unable to compete and sell their product as a result of the terrible 
negotiation skills of the politicians (Appendix A, 6:5). In this instance, foreign nations such 
as China play the part of the competition, once again. Before continuing his anecdotes 
about the devastating effects of the incompetent leaders, he gets side-tracked into 
talking about the Chinese military capabilities. He warns that they are building a military 
stronghold in the form of an island and claims that China poses a bigger threat than ISIS 
(Appendix A, 7:6). He describes their military with the predication ‘scary’ to underline the 
severity of the situation before making the jump to calling Mexico the new China 
(Appendix A, 7:7), which as we have just learned, is a nation to be feared. 
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He then continues with an anecdote, this time about how Ford moved part of their 
production to Mexico, which is not good (Appendix A, 7:14). Trump explains how he 
would fix this problem if possible even before he gets into office, by himself, despite the 
fact that he knows and works with all the best negotiators in the world (Appendix A, 7:20). 
He explains through a hypothetical dialogue how he would call up the head of Ford and 
pressure him into building his factory in the US by threatening him with applied taxes 
(Appendix A, 8:1). He presents himself as a tough negotiator as he in his story refuses to 
back down and the head of Ford begging him and eventually ending up caving to 
Trump’s demands (Appendix A, 9:5). 
Trump is able to be tough on corporations because he is a self-owned and very rich man. 
The fact that he is rich means that he possesses the right thinking for leading the country, 
because it has to be made rich again (Appendix A, 8:24). 
The foreign policy blunders of the American past are brought up again when Trump is 
talking about the American problems with countries in the Middle East. He claims to have 
made “(…) all the right predictions on Iraq” (Appendix A, 9:20) and brings into question 
the intelligence of Bush and Rubio, because they were unable to answer “(…) the 
question on Iraq” (Appendix A, 9:23) thereby disassociating himself from the other 
politicians and in particular, his rival republican candidates. He directly states that ‘they 
don’t have a clue’ and that they ‘can’t lead’ (Appendix A, 9:29) - he is thus blaming the 
political establishment for the issues. 
His own personality is the subject of his next passage and what qualifies him to be 
president. He addresses the fact that a journalist said he was not a nice person by 
claiming that he in fact is a nice person and backs up the claim by saying he gives a lot to 
charities (Appendix A, 10:16). He talks about his personal accomplishments in wealth 
(Appendix A, 10:30), how he started off small and fought his way to the top (Appendix A, 
10:31), how he did not back down from the ‘big leagues’ (Appendix A, 11:1) and how he 
has employed tens of thousands, thereby providing them with ‘medical’, ‘education’ and 
‘everything’ (Appendix A, 11:13). All these accomplishments are directly related to some 
of the biggest problems facing America, as we have previously heard and he thereby 
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manages to present himself as a man who is good at all the right things. On top of this, 
he is worth over nine billion dollars and as he has previously concluded: rich is great. This 
is arguably an early sign of a neoliberal discourse (Springer 2012).  
The state of the American economy is once again the subject matter of his next passage, 
but this time Trump sums up and lists a set of policies as his immediate response when 
entering office. Repealing Obamacare, which he gives the negative predicate ‘the big lie’ 
(Appendix A, 12:18) and building a ‘great wall’ to protect their southern border (Appendix 
A, 12:20) would be among his first orders. He would strike down on ISIS (Appendix A, 
12:24) and support the Second Amendment (Appendix A, 13:4). The fact that he promises 
to strike down hard on foreign threats and thus talks foreign policy is usually seen as a 
prerequisite for successful republican politicians (da Nobrega 2013). He promises to 
rebuild the country’s infrastructure way below cost and on time (Appendix A, 13:18). The 
examples he uses to underline his point is how the roads across America are overpriced 
and how he himself has been able to restore the ‘Old Post Office’, a famous building 
which he managed to purchase from the Obama administration, leaving people ‘shocked’ 
(Appendix A, 13:26). Once again, Trump has shown how much better at negotiating he is 
than the politicians in office. 
He warns of another financial bubble on the way due to bloated stock markets, markets 
he understands and has had success navigating (Appendix A, 14:9), one that could 
potentially be a lot bigger than what we have experienced in the past and tells his 
supporters to be careful (Appendix A, 14: 11). 
He finally comes to his conclusion; 
“Sadly, the American dream is dead. But if I get elected president I will bring it back 
bigger and better and stronger than ever before, and we will make America great 
again”.  
(Appendix A, 14:14) 
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Categories 
Our initial examination of the speech reveals that several thematic categories are present 
throughout the entirety of the speech. Despite his relatively loose structure and a 
seemingly improvisational attitude when speaking, he maintains a form of consistency 
when it comes to the subject matter of his speech.  
Throughout, he criticises the current government, his fellow republicans and politicians as 
a collective group. His criticisms are far reaching, blaming them for everything from 
lacking the skills necessary to negotiate with foreign states to the poor state of the 
American economy. As his criticisms are actually pinned on all politicians, rather than just 
the Democratic Party, this brings us to calling our first thematic category ‘The 
Establishment’, to reflect that it pertains to the entire political establishment in America. 
Criticising the establishment can here be seen as a combination of using scapegoating, 
shifting the blame to the establishment, as well as an integral part neoliberal discourse 
(Preston & Silke 2011).  
Secondly, a prevailing theme in his speech is how he explains the domestic problems 
facing America and what he considers to be the problem. As we established, the political 
establishment are to blame for the poor state of the economy and as we have seen, 
wealth and greatness are closely related according to the values of Trump. The problems 
with unemployment, low GDP, low labour participation rates, the decaying infrastructure 
and the trillions of dollars in debt, are all problems closely related to the economy. So our 
next thematic category has been assigned with the name ‘The Economy’. This category 
seems interesting to us on the surface, as it could be a potential battleground for 
neoliberal, and neoconservative or nationalist, discourse (Woodley 2013).  
When it comes to placing the blame for the struggling economy and lack of American 
greatness, the incompetence of the American political establishment is only one side of 
the coin. Their incompetence is further worsened by the overwhelming competence of 
competing nations, such as China and Mexico. They pose a direct threat to the US and 
not just to the economy. Militarily they pose a great threat and are growing stronger while 
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the US is getting weaker. However, the enemies are not all in the form of sovereign 
nations competing with America. Islamic Terrorism is also mentioned as a threat and the 
threat Mexico poses to America reaches far beyond just financial competition. So we 
have decided to include ‘Foreign Threats’ as a thematic category, pertaining to all the 
issues he mentions in relation to threats that are not domestic. This category contains 
themes such as transnational competition and foreign enemies, which could be the sign 
of neoliberal (Springer 2012) and right-wing populist (Wodak 2015) discourses.  
Finally, through the entirety of his speech, Trump talks about himself. Through the use of 
personal anecdotes, hypothetical dialogues, listing his accomplishments and his 
representation of what the problems in America are, he paints a picture of what kind of 
president he wants to be and some of the core values he represents. His tough military 
stance, negotiation skills, and economic competence all add to his description of what 
President Trump would be like. Our final thematic category has been given the name 
“President Trump”. One could argue that Trump is using the ‘state of permanent 
emergency paradigm’ (Agamben in Kerr 2008) as many politicians before him. 
 
Category analysis 
This chapter will concentrate on the thematic categories derived from the initial linear 
analysis. The four thematic categories are thoroughly analysed and the results discussed 
in relation to prior critical discourse work and social theory. 
 
The Establishment 
Throughout the announcement speech, Trump manages to create a discursive 
representation of an inherent problem in America, as stated in the hyperbole: “We got 
nothing but problems” (Appendix A 8:26). These problems manifest themselves within the 
political establishment and cover a problematization of the role and expectations of the 
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ideal politician, and more specifically, how the current leaders of the US do not live up to 
these expectations. In this chapter our aim is to reveal how Trump discursively creates a 
description of what is wrong with the establishment in the US, by analysing the text and 
discursive practice of the speech.  
“How are these people gonna lead us? How are we gonna— how are we gonna go back 
and make it great again? We can’t. They don’t have a clue. They can’t lead us. They 
can’t. They can’t even answer simple questions. It was terrible”. 
(Appendix A, 9:28) 
The above quote shows an inherent power relation within the speech, where an 
oppositional relation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ manifests itself between the establishment and the 
general public. The establishment are the current American politicians and the general 
public, ‘we the people’, are who Trump identifies himself with in the speech. According to 
Woodley (2013) presenting the ‘us’ as ‘the people’ is historically a right-wing populist 
feature. This combined with the idea that it is a clear neoliberal feature to criticise the 
political establishment (Preston & Silke 2011) as well as a right-wing populist feature 
according to Wodak (2015) is highly intriguing. This could be what Woodley (2013) calls 
the nexus of neoconservatism and neoliberalism. 
“They will not bring us— believe me— to the promised land. They will not” (Appendix A, 
3:5) This quote exemplifies that the establishment is continuously referred to in a 
distancing manner from the discursively constructed ‘us’. Besides ‘they’ and ‘them’ the 
establishment is continually referred to in terms such as ‘the politicians’ (Appendix A, 1:5) 
and ‘these people’ (Appendix A, 9:18). This way of referring to the members of the 
establishment through the use of words such as ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘these people’ makes 
it possible for the audience to distance themselves from the establishment. Trump is 
controlling the discourse and is thereby able to control the audience’s minds, creating the 
‘us/them’ relation, manifesting a hegemonic reproduction and strong power relation (van 
Dijk 2001). Furthermore, this is a way for Trump to identify himself with ‘the people’. 
Again we see how ‘us’ is defined as ‘the people’ which is traditionally a right-wing 
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populist way of naming the ‘us’ in political speeches (Wodak 2015). When he speaks in 
terms such as ‘us’, ‘we’ and ‘our’, he underlines how he is a citizen rather than a politician 
and therefore cannot be labelled as an elitist part of the establishment. Criticising the 
political establishment in this way is evidence of a neoliberal and right-wing populist 
discourse (Silke & Preston 2011; Wodak 2015). He does so through this metaphor; 
“We have all the cards, but we don’t know how to use them. We don’t even know that 
we have the cards, because our leaders don’t understand the game”. 
(Appendix A, 6:30)   
Trump stresses this distancing relation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by using a specific set of 
negatively loaded predications in addressing the Other. This use of negative predications 
makes it even easier for ‘the people’ to distance themselves from the politicians and 
therefore the establishment; “How stupid are our leaders? How stupid are these 
politicians to allow this to happen? How stupid are they?” (Appendix A, 5:9). 
It is assumable that no one prefers to be identified with a character or institution 
described in a negative fashion, and thus, by applying these negatively loaded 
predications, Trump constructs a discursive understanding of the establishment, as not 
only the Other, but also as something bad, representing a problem. Trump accuses the 
establishment for avoiding the actual problems and people’s needs; 
“I watch the speeches of these people, and they say the sun will rise, the moon will 
set, all sorts of wonderful things will happen. And people are saying, “What’s going 
on? I just want a job. Just get me a job. I don’t need the rhetoric. I want a job”. 
(Appendix A, 3:18) 
Subtly and without much attention, Trump manages to accuse the establishment of 
empty rhetoric and at the same time discursively position himself to have risen above 
such a thing. Given Trump’s authoritative appearance, this statement is likely to be fully 
accepted without further consideration of his followers (van Dijk 2001). In that sense, he 
confirms the power relation between himself and the audience once more. There are 
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arguably populist undertones in this quote, given Trump’s “(...) appeal to the ‘common 
man/woman’ as opposed to the elites” (Wodak 2015:7). 
He believes the politicians to be “(...) controlled fully by the lobbyists, by the donors, and 
by the special interests (...)” (Appendix A, 4:1), resulting in the destruction of the country 
(Appendix A, 4:5). He refers to them as losers, who are morally corrupt (Appendix A, 
12:10) and incapable of negotiating (Appendix A, 5:13) or leading the country (Appendix 
A, 9:28).  
Behind the many negatively loaded namings and predications, a presupposition based on 
Trump’s idea of the ideal leader can be located. The problems with the establishment are 
presented through a description of the current inadequate leaders. In this sense, it is 
unnecessary for Trump to characterise what the ideal leader must be capable of, given 
the strong reference to a failed establishment. 
According to Trump, any successful politician must be intelligent and most importantly, 
driven by the needs of the people rather than lobbyists, special interests and donors, 
otherwise “(...) it’s just not going to work” (Appendix A, 5:27). He constructs a set of 
expectations related to politicians by describing a bad leader. Thereby he discursively 
constructs and presents the image of the establishment as being incompetent leaders. In 
the continual critique of the political establishment we see hints of neoliberal as well as 
right-wing populist discourses. Wodak stresses that both left and right-wing populist 
rhetoric place society in two homogeneous groups, ‘the corrupt elite’, and ‘the pure 
people’ whose will should be reflected in the good democracy (Wodak 2015:8). Trump is 
balancing between somewhat contradictory statements when presenting himself as a 
populist great leader-to-be, as well as criticising the idea of elitist leaders in general. This 
difficult balance between anti-establishment and authoritative leadership, still in favour of 
the liberal democracy, is evidently obtained by Trump (Wodak 2015).  
Throughout the speech there is an underlying critique of the governance in its entirety. 
The idea of the American people’s needs, as the core of a desirable political leadership 
permeates Trump’s discursive construction of the establishment and how it has failed to 
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govern the country; “Because we have to stop doing things for some people, but for this 
country, it’s destroying our country. We have to stop, and it has to stop now” (Appendix 
A, 4:5).  
The discursive relation between bad and good, right and wrong, is further supported by 
the modality of the speech. On numerous occasions, the description and discursive 
construction of the incompetent politician is strengthened through the use of modal 
verbs;  
“How are these people gonna lead us? How are we gonna— how are we gonna go 
back and make it great again? We can’t. They don’t have a clue. They can’t lead us. 
They can’t. They can’t even answer simple questions. It was terrible”. 
 (Appendix A, 9:28) 
The negation ‘can’t’ and the use of modal verbs such as ‘will not’ (Appendix A, 3:5) and 
‘has to stop’ (Appendix A, 4:5) indicates Trump’s attitude towards the direction in which 
the establishment is taking the country. The modality of the speech supports the 
construction of the discursive relation between the bad or incompetent politician, who 
represents the establishment and the discursively constructed ‘the people’. 
 
Summing up 
Through analysis of the political establishment’s role in the announcement speech, it has 
become evident that Trump describes how the lack of competent leadership is at the root 
of the problems inherent within America. By describing the trouble with the current 
governance, and doing so through the discursive representation of ‘bad leadership’, 
Trump creates the idea of ‘ideal leadership’. The ideal leadership can assure the rights 
and welfare of ‘the people’, and is not influenced by special interests. Simultaneously, 
Trump constructs a discursive distance between ‘us’, ‘the people’, including Trump 
himself, and ‘them’, the political establishment. We therefore argue that the discursive 
practice, relating to exactly this thematic category, is a discursive construction of the 
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ideal leadership, which is not being matched by the current leaders of America. 
Furthermore, this is a sign of an underlying presence of the discourse of exceptionalism.  
Trump characterises the ideal leader as an individual who is a good negotiator, who 
accounts for the people’s interests, and is not influenced by donors and other political 
factions with special agendas. It can be argued that the depiction of the ideal leader is 
equivalent to a discursive description of the American people as a whole. In other words, 
America needs a leader, who can secure a specific set of American values. The main 
discourse present within this section of analysis is that The Establishment is to blame for 
all problems in the US. This can be seen as both a neoliberal (Springer 2012) and right-
wing populist (Wodak 2015) discourse, as it can be considered a critique of the political 
establishment as well as the political system. 
 
Foreign Threats 
When looking at the category of Foreign Threats, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ pattern emerges 
once more. However, this case of ‘us’ and ‘them’ works at a macro level and focuses on 
the American people as ‘us’, and ‘them’, as any foreign competitor (Appendix A, 1:28) or 
enemy (Appendix A, 2:23), be it a state or an organisation. Wodak (2015) points out that, 
in principle and often with a strategic or manipulative purpose, any group can be 
constructed as the Other. Moreover, current populism seems to have a focus on the 
perceived foreign enemies, threatening ‘us’ from abroad. An often used simplistic 
populist response to foreign threats, and the fear they create within the population, is a 
frequent scapegoating of the Other (Wodak 2015). When Trump addresses the Other, he 
often turns to traditional stereotypes and images of the enemy, and offers very simple 
solutions, for example in the shape of building a wall along the Mexican border to keep 
the enemy out. 
The nationalist idea of ‘us’ sharing one national identity and foreigners being ‘them’ or 
‘they’, is clearly exemplified in the vast amount of times ‘they’ is used to describe either 
China and Japan (Appendix A, 5:6), Mexico (Appendix A, 1:15) and Islamic terrorism 
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(Appendix, 1:28). This ‘us’ and ‘them’ relation further describes an inherent presence of a 
general xenophobic understanding of anything that does not meet the measures of the 
US. This is often associated with right-wing populism which is generally nationalist, 
whereas left-wing populism is traditionally considered more internationally focused 
(Wodak 2015). By using xenophobic and nationalistic utterances, Trump enables the 
audience to grasp the differences between themselves and the enemy, and exactly this 
construction of discourses presenting xenophobic and nationalistic statements is 
interesting. 
A clear division between ‘them’ and ‘us’ becomes evident on a macro nationalist scale. 
‘We’, ‘our’ and ‘us’ in this case relate to the entire American population, whereas ‘they’ 
and ‘them’ is used to describe any foreign threat. This establishes a discursive 
understanding of the nationalist US being inferior to China and even Mexico. They are 
simply better competitors and something must be done about it. A power relation 
between ‘us’ and the Other thus becomes evident. This is interestingly contradictory as 
he both praises the Other and blames them for several issues. 
In the speech, Mexicans are described as ‘people that have lots of problems’ (Appendix 
A, 1:18), and ‘not the right people’ (Appendix A, 1:22). Trump states that; “They’re 
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists” (Appendix A, 1:18). Mexico and 
the other foreign threats are portrayed as ‘our enemy’ (Appendix A, 2:23) and furthermore, 
China is depicted as a bigger military problem than ISIS (Appendix A, 7:5). Mexico is 
pulled in as the nemesis or main antagonist of the narrative, when he immediately states 
that Mexico is ‘the new China’ (Appendix A, 7:7). Naming in this sense contributes to a 
general sense of particular foreigners representing a major threat to the US. A creation of 
fear supports a legitimisation of exclusionary politics and thereby a legitimisation of the 
leader, who articulates the threat (Wodak 2015). This exclusionary rhetoric has a direct 
link to “(...) common-sense and traditional (conservative) values” (Wodak 2015:22).  
When addressing the enemy, China, Trump is constantly using a certain form of positive 
predications to describe ‘them’ as better than ‘us’. This is repeated several times 
throughout the speech in statements such as “Our enemies are getting stronger and 
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stronger by the way, and we as a country are getting weaker” (Appendix A, 2:23). Here, 
the enemies are depicted as getting stronger and being better, and the US getting weaker 
or being worse as a result thereof. The enemies are being better competitors than the US 
and thus the US is failing. This is arguably evidence of neoliberal discourses as 
transnational competition plays a major part in these (Springer 2012). This is followed up 
by praise of foreign nations, particularly China, on several occasions; when he says “(...) 
their deal’s even better” (Appendix A, 5:6), “(...) they devalue their currency so brilliantly 
(...)” (Appendix A, 5:29) and again when talking about the infrastructure of China; “(...) 
China, you go there now, roads, bridges, schools, you never saw anything like it” 
(Appendix A, 6:27). The predications he uses paint a very clear picture of China being 
better and the US needing to catch up and regain its former greatness. Through the 
themes of foreign threats, Trump manages to blame these for the problems of the US. 
This can be understood as deliberate scapegoating through a neoliberal discourse of the 
US needing to compete better on the transnational economic battle field. 
‘They’ are stealing ‘our’ jobs and ‘they’ are ‘killing us’. Once again the presence of 
xenophobic and nationalistic statements becomes an important factor in the construction 
of discourse. Trump places a strong emphasis on the fact that the problem’s origin is 
found behind the borders of America. When China and other foreign threats are portrayed 
as better and becoming stronger than America, an inherent presupposition becomes 
prevalent, namely that America used to be better and stronger than these foreign threats. 
The threats are the result of an idle America, a nation that has not done enough to 
become better. Not the foreign threats simply becoming better by themselves. China, in 
this case, is the competition that America needs to measure itself against. Again we see 
evidence of a neoliberal discourse of competition supposedly making ‘us’ better. 
However, Mexico is presupposed as deliberately worsening the state of the union by 
unloading their criminals, rapists and drugs (Appendix A, 1:18) as well as their active role 
in the disappearance of American jobs (Appendix A, 7:10). This argument is strengthened 
by the use of hyperboles and metaphors such as “They kill us. I beat China all the time. All 
the time” (Appendix A, 1:10) or “The US has become a dumping ground for everybody 
else’s problems” (Appendix A, 1:17). With these utterances, Trump creates a discursive 
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understanding of Mexico arguably being a scapegoat. Trump is blaming Mexico for the 
issues of America. There is no problem with ‘us’, it is ‘them’ that carries the blame.  
Mexico and China being foreign threats are thus discursively linked to the worsening of 
the US throughout the text. It has become evident that Trump uses the foreign threats as 
antagonists of his narrative. They are the enemy that must be defeated for America to 
become great again. Trump blames the Other for the fact that America is no longer great. 
At the same time Trump constructs a discursive understanding that he knows how to deal 
with ‘them’.  
 
Summing up 
The representation of the thematic category foreign threats is generally consisting of a 
strong utilisation of a classical construction of discourses relying on xenophobic and 
nationalist statements. This utilisation becomes apparent in analysing the discursive 
power relation that is presented between ‘us’ (The American people) and ‘them’ (foreign 
threats), where a consistent reliance of xenophobic statements strengthens the discursive 
positioning between America and the threats from afar. A discourse of exceptionalism 
towards foreign competition becomes further evident and in this case it refers to the 
presupposed American urge to assure international superiority. 
The ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse shows a power relation where America should be superior 
and the reason why America is inferior is the Other. Therefore, the utilisation of 
xenophobic statements and utterances enables the audience to position themselves in 
relation to the threats from afar, and simultaneously makes it possible for them to point 
out who is to blame. The main discourse that is revealed through analysis of this thematic 
category is therefore that American inferiority within the international field of competition 
is blamed on foreign threats. Again Trump blames the Other like he does with the 
establishment. This further points towards the discourses being based on neoliberalism, 
as the field of battle chosen by Trump seems to be international competition (Springer 
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2012). The discourse is arguably based on nationalism and right-wing populism as well, 
as it portrays the entire American population as ‘the people’ and thus as one unified force 
(Wodak 2015). 
 
The Economy  
The lack of competent leadership has previously been analysed in the thematic category 
‘The Establishment’. And the discursive articulation of America, being undermined 
through international competition by foreign threats, has been described above. The 
focus of this thematic category will be centred around the analysis of a specific macro 
political issue; namely the American economy. We will show how Trump manages to 
discursively construct a certain degree of tangibility when addressing the economic 
problems of America, for example by addressing the lack of jobs instead of employing 
statistics. Again, Trump seems to use a lower level of complexity in his language, which is 
usually seen in anti-intellectualist, right-wing populist rhetoric (Wodak 2015). This is 
further supported by the readability analysis conducted earlier. We argue that it is a way 
to mask the dominant position he finds himself in, covering up the inequality between him 
and his audience (van Dijk 2001). In this sense, the power relation is disguised and less 
direct than situations where he refers directly to his wealth, and by that pointing out the 
obvious gap between himself and the general public.  
“According to the economists— who I’m not big believers in, but, nevertheless, this is 
what they’re saying— that $24 trillion— we’re very close— that’s the point of no return. 
$24 trillion. We will be there soon. That’s when we become Greece. That’s when we 
become a country that’s unsalvageable. And we’re gonna be there very soon. We’re 
gonna be there very soon”. 
(Appendix A, 12:14) 
This quote stresses the severity of America’s debt. To assure that the message is 
received as intended, Trump uses Greece as an analogy to exemplify the current 
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economic state in the US. Using Greece as a symbol, Trump plays on a contemporary 
international understanding of a country, devastated by economic hardship. The analogy 
is used to stress the presupposition that the current economic state of Greece is 
undesirable, and that the American economic path needs to be diverted to avoid the 
impending disaster. In a comparison of the two countries, Trump confirms the macro 
power relation, where inequality and dominance are heavily reproduced in favour of 
America. The same presupposition is evident in the following comparison of the US and 
third world countries; 
“So we have to rebuild our infrastructure, our bridges, our roadways, our airports. You 
come into La Guardia Airport, it’s like we’re in a third world country. You look at the 
patches and the 40-year-old floor. They throw down asphalt, and they throw. You look 
at these airports, we are like a third world country. (...) We have to rebuild our 
infrastructure”. 
(Appendix A, 13:31) 
Referring to the current economic situation as one belonging in the third world, an 
underlying presupposition exists. The symbolic reference presents a status that the US 
should not aspire to become. Trump contextualises the American economic situation by 
using the metaphor of a dilapidated airport. Describing the outdated airport and the lack 
of in-depth maintenance, Trump paints a picture of a general mishandling of the American 
economy. He arguably implements exactly this metaphorical description of the economy, 
with the aim of assuring tangibility of a rather intangible macro political situation. By this, 
he seeks to demonstrate his superiority (van Dijk 2001), not only over his audience, but 
also over the establishment in charge of the economy, as well as over other countries. 
This is an example of power relations that move beyond the obvious speaker/receiver 
relation, in this case the Trump/audience relation, and becomes a macro power relation 
between countries and other large actors.  
Using bridges, roadways, and airports as examples, Trump constructs a relation between 
the problem, the audience, and their social context. Infrastructure is easy to relate to and 
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holds an important position in a well-functioning society. He presents a simplistic version 
of a much more complex level of problems and offers the audience a point of reference to 
the severity of the problem in a matter-of-factly manner, aiming for acceptance without 
further questioning or hesitation from his followers. He points out the severity of the 
problems by associating America with countries that one would normally not, and plays 
on the fear of getting weaker and weaker.  
Given that the common American does not necessarily have any relation to macro 
political issues or to the subject GDP, Trump makes the subject more tangible and 
informal for his audience. He uses metaphorical, analogical, and comparative symbols to 
communicate the level of brokenness and how the American people should feel about it. 
He is arguably in a powerful position where he can control the minds of his followers and 
he is making use of that situation. This construction of a specific attitude towards the 
current American economic situation, is further underlined by the use of modal verbs 
within the description of the problems. To further assure the tangibility, Trump uses 
another tool to create a link between the macro political issue and the American people. 
Trump stresses that the undesirable path of the American economy is obvious through 
the labour participation rate; 
“Last quarter, it was just announced our gross domestic product— a sign of strength, 
right? But not for us. It was below zero. Whoever heard of this? It’s never below 
zero. Our labor participation rate was the worst since 1978. But think of it, GDP below 
zero, horrible labor participation rate. And our real unemployment is anywhere from 18 
to 20 percent Don’t believe the 5,6 [percent]. Don’t believe it”. 
(Appendix A, 2:13)  
This discursive construction of a broken economy is strengthened through a focus on the 
horrible labour participation rate and the many Americans without jobs. Through a lexical 
analytical lens, these examples make the problematization of the domestic economic 
situation more relatable to the audience. The audience's potential lack of knowledge or 
insight in the standards and ideals associated with a country’s GDP are bridged by using 
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the word ‘job(s)’ as a catalyst of meaning. Trump implements the predication of the 
labour participation rate as being both ‘horrible’ and ‘the worst since 1978’. By this, he 
manages to communicate how crucial the problem is, and why Americans should care 
about it. 
 
Summing up 
Trump’s problematization and discursive representation of the current economic state of 
America, consists of a specific use of symbols that assures a specific degree of 
tangibility. This arguably entails that the messages are more easily digestible for the 
audience. He compares the American economy to the undesirable Greek one, thus 
stressing the severity of both the situation and how it should be perceived by the 
American people. Moreover, this representation is strengthened by his contextualisation 
of the economy with an emphasis on the lack of jobs. This is how Trump shows the 
audience that the high unemployment rate is a product of an overall declining economic 
situation in America. He furthermore argues that this has a direct consequence for the 
American people. The American economy is under pressure, and this pressure manifests 
itself on an everyday basis of the American people, because of a general lack of jobs and 
a declining state of public infrastructure.  
The overall discursive construction that becomes apparent in the analysis of the thematic 
category ‘The Economy’, is the underlying description of the American economy as being 
on a destructive path towards the abyss. The main discourse that arises within the 
analysis of this category is therefore that the poor economy, exemplified in the lack of 
jobs, is the symptom of a political system brought to its knees by incompetent politicians 
and foreign threats. Trump constructs a causal relation between the Other, being foreign 
threats or the establishment, having the blame on one side, and on the other side the 
problems of the American economy. He thus blames the two different Others for the 
economic trouble and lack of jobs in the US. Wodak (2015) argues that a leader must 
save ‘the people’ from economic instability in traditional right-wing populist ideology. 
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President Trump 
Through the above analysis we have shown how Trump constructs issues through the 
articulation and problematization of three categories; the political establishment, the 
American economy and foreign threats.  
The establishment has been portrayed as the scapegoat of the economic problems in the 
US; they are incompetent and influenced by their donors. Through this problematization, 
and a thorough description of what Trump deems wrong with the current leaders, he has 
implicitly constructed a set of criteria necessary to lead the country, which they are not 
fulfilling. These criteria are naturally related to his own strengths as is evident in the 
following quote; 
“So I’ve watched the politicians. I’ve dealt with them all my life. If you can’t make a 
good deal with a politician, then there’s something wrong with you. You’re certainly 
not very good. And that’s what we have representing us. They will never make America 
great again. They don’t even have a chance. They’re controlled fully— they’re 
controlled fully by the lobbyists, by the donors, and by the special interests, fully”. 
(Appendix A, 3:34) 
By pointing out the flaws of the establishment and turning the population against it, 
Trump seeks to take over the traditional power relation between leaders and the public, 
by placing himself at the top (van Dijk 2001). As we have previously established, Trump 
describes what is wrong with the current governance of the US through a depiction of 
bad leadership. The ideal leadership is driven by the people’s needs, and can assure the 
rights and welfare of the American people, because it is not influenced by external 
factors. This is a very non-neoliberal way of thinking and can be considered an argument 
posed by right-wing populists traditionally (Wodak 2015). Furthermore, he manages to 
distance himself enough from ‘them’ to create the understanding that he is not controlled 
by lobbyists and is essentially a free, self-owned man; 
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“Hey, I have lobbyists. I have to tell you. I have lobbyists that can produce anything for 
me. They’re great. But you know what? it won’t happen. It won’t happen. Because we 
have to stop doing things for some people, but for this country, it’s destroying our 
country”. 
(Appendix A, 13:31) 
In the above quote Trump stresses his distance from special interests, making him stand 
out as the highest placed actor in the power relation, with no one enacting their power on 
him (van Dijk 2001). He is letting people know that he is not influenced by other agendas 
than that of making America great again. The way in which Trump stresses how he is not 
driven by anything but the people’s needs is an example of the discourse of 
exceptionalism, which permeates Trump’s representation of himself as the preferable 
leader, as he claims to live up to all of the criteria of an ideal leader.  
Another important criterion for the ideal leadership is talented negotiators, who can deal 
with politicians. Trump believes that anybody should possess this skillset and points out 
his personal experience in this field. This criterion is so important and specific that he 
presents the solution to the problem as follows: 
“Now, our country needs— our country needs a truly great leader, and we need a truly 
great leader now. We need a leader that wrote “The Art of the Deal”.  
(Appendix A, 4:7) 
The presupposition within this quote is that Trump, as the author of “The Art of the Deal”, 
is the truly great leader that the country needs. Furthermore, the quote underlines 
Trump’s idea of the ideal leadership as someone who is a talented negotiator - and even 
further stresses that he indeed fits exactly this profile. This is another example of how the 
discourse of exceptionalism is present regarding Trump’s exceptional skills as an 
experienced negotiator. Through this discourse we see evidence of further scapegoating.  
The above mentioned critique of the political establishment is further linked to Trump’s 
general problematization of America’s international relations, and the 
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arising from incompetent leadership. He is blaming the Other over and over and secondly 
presenting himself as the leader to fix the problems of America. By discursively 
positioning himself as a great negotiator, and therefore as the exact opposite to the 
current political establishment, Trump insinuates that he would be a superior leader, 
compared to the established political candidates. We have thus established how Trump 
blames foreigners for American problems; how Mexico is sending their criminals and 
rapists, how Japan is no longer buying American vehicles and how China is ‘killing us’.  
“That’s right. A lot of people up there can’t get jobs. They can’t get jobs, because 
there are no jobs, because China has our jobs and Mexico has our jobs. They all have 
jobs”. 
(Appendix A, 2:19) 
Trump places the blame on foreign powers and nations – ‘they’ have the jobs and they 
have stolen it from the discursively created ‘us’. Again, Trump promises the audience 
what they want to hear; “I’ll bring back our jobs from China, from Mexico, from Japan, 
from so many places. I’ll bring back our jobs, and I’ll bring back our money” (Appendix A, 
5:4). The two quotes show us that Trump primarily constructs a problem and blames 
foreign powers and threats. This is evidence of the aforementioned power relation 
between foreign threats and ‘us’ - ‘the people’. A nationalist discourse is once more 
revealed of ‘us’ having to become better than the enemies abroad. Secondly, he 
positions himself as the solution to this problem. When, or if, he becomes president, he 
will make sure the jobs are no longer on Chinese or Mexican ground. A power relation 
between Trump and the foreign threats is thus revealed. Through the discourse of 
exceptionalism Trump is picturing himself as the best negotiator, best leader, and for this 
reason, the best presidential candidate. The power has once more shifted to the macro 
level of analysis. He has moved from discursive elements, such as persuasion, and now 
addresses dominance and power on a much larger scale (van Dijk 2001). To emphasize 
this clear power relation, Trump makes sure to let everyone know that; “Nobody would be 
tougher on ISIS than Donald Trump. Nobody” (Appendix A, 12:24). 
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The economic situation of the US is portrayed in the speech through the emphasis on the 
lack of jobs. The establishment is blamed for poor negotiation skills, and foreign powers 
for the theft of jobs and work. Put differently, the problem is the economy and the lack of 
jobs, whereas the guilty are the establishment and the foreign threats. From all the 
problems and all those responsible, Trump emerges as the solution to everything. In this 
case the discourse of exceptionalism becomes evident, as Trump discursively construct 
an understanding of himself as a personified version of the standards and ideals of a 
good leader. Trump constructs the equation of his success as a businessman as the 
equivalent to his success as president. Focusing on his abilities to create jobs and rebuild 
the economy through his own real estate accomplishments, he seeks to position himself 
as the best candidate to resolve the job problem; “I will be the greatest jobs president 
that God ever created” (Appendix A, 5:3). Presenting himself as a saviour is a typical 
right-wing populist rhetorical feature, where the leader’s protection against threats are 
naturally followed by the people’s inductive reasoning that it will happen again (Wodak 
2015).  
In addition to the explanation of his planned intentions as president, he is referring to the 
results he has already achieved; “I’ve employed— I’ve employed tens of thousands of 
people over my lifetime” (Appendix A, 11:13). Again, he intends to equate being a great 
businessman to a great leader. This can be seen as the neoliberal and right-wing populist 
discourses clashing. However, by scapegoating and thus blaming the political 
establishment and foreign threats, he makes this a smooth battle. By playing with the 
authority and trustworthiness, he targets his followers’ lack of knowledge about the 
information he presents, and aims for the unconditional trust (van Dijk 2001).  
Indirectly, he blames the establishment, and the people in charge of America’s economy, 
of being incapable of processing the finances of the country. Moreover, he refers to 
funded campaigning as being equal to a leader incapable of controlling the country’s 
economy: “I’m using my own money. I’m not using the lobbyists. I’m not using donors. I 
don’t care. I’m really rich” (Appendix A, 8:20). According to Trump, being self-funded is 
the equivalent of an honest and fair candidate, who has the nation’s needs as his primary 
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concern. Throughout the speech, Trump addresses the current hegemonic order, where 
the establishment has full control but fails to deliver results over and over again. By virtue 
of his economic, intellectual and social privilege, he has gained access to a dominant 
public discourse from where he attempts to challenge the established hegemony (van 
Dijk 2001). He is arguably in a powerful position that has enabled him to control the minds 
of the people he is speaking to, turning them against the establishment and towards him 
as the solution.  
 
The linguistic inferences of the slogan 
The theories of cognitive pragmatics will be included with the aim of locating patterns of 
repeated meaning or coherence within the construction of discourses in the speech. 
Additionally, we will analyse these patterns in relation to the slogan Make America Great 
Again. Looking at the slogan, two contextually founded, linguistic inferences become 
apparent. The first is a deductive inference, referring to the underlying premise of the 
slogan, describing that at least one problem is currently present in the US. For this 
reason, the premise rests on the ability of the slogans creator to validate the claim that 
something is out of order to assure discourse comprehension. The inference is deductive 
in nature due to its context, where a validation of the slogan itself relies on a validation of 
the premise. Trump manages to discursively construct the validation of the premise 
throughout his speech. Through the analysis of the three categories, we have established 
Trump’s repeated use and construction of specific discourses and power relations.  
We have, through the analysis of each thematic category, stated how three distinct, yet 
intertwined, main discourses have been constructed to describe the problematization of 
the current situation in the US, namely; 
1) The Establishment is to blame for all problems in the US. 
• Visible in the analysis of the thematic category ‘The Establishment’. 
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2) American inferiority within the international field of competition is blamed on 
foreign threats.   
• Visible in the analysis of the thematic category ‘Foreign Threats’. 
3) The poor economy, exemplified in the lack of jobs, is the symptom of a 
political system brought to its knees by incompetent politicians and foreign 
threats. 
• Visible in the analysis of the thematic category ‘The Economy’. 
Each of the discourses act as an individual part of the validation of the deductive 
inference. In combination, they can assure a general discourse comprehension, as well as 
a combined value, in the audience.  
The problematic domestic situation is described with symbolic and analogical points of 
reference, such as jobs and infrastructure. This enables the audience to personify with 
the problem itself. Trump uses exactly these symbolic and analogical features in the 
discursive construction of the problems relating to the general naming of the thematic 
category ‘The Economy’. This creates a point of reference from which the audience can 
navigate in their search of those who are to blame for the current situation in the US. By 
simultaneously constructing a picture of American inferiority in an international context, 
Trump makes it possible for the audience to locate a preliminary source of the domestic 
problems in the US. This source of the situation is constructed as the Other, in this case 
personified by foreign threats in many shapes and figures, who are the ones to blame. 
The problematization of the domestic situation evident within the analysis of the thematic 
category ‘The Economy’, and how it has been affected by foreign threats, is further 
contextualized in the discursive presentation of the establishment. The discursive 
construction of the problematization of the current governance and leadership of the US 
makes it possible for the audience to align the two other problematized areas of focus, 
and thereby locate a common denominator which affects both the domestic and 
international affairs of the US. This common denominator is discursively represented 
when he talks about the establishment. This triadic construction of discursive relations in 
the problematization of the current situation in the US, therefore acts as the validation 
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that is necessary in the construction of the premise of a deductive inference. The 
deductive inference presented in the slogan itself is therefore validated discursively. 
When combined they create a specific premise resting upon the discursive representation 
of a number of problems inherent in the US. 
The second inference that is apparent within the slogan is derived from the part of the 
slogan that focuses on repairing what is broken. After having discursively validated the 
premise of the slogan itself within the announcement speech, Trump continues to focus 
on how to fix the problems he has listed i.e. ‘Making America Great Again’. This process 
has previously been described in the section that focuses on the discursive 
representation of thematic category “President Trump”. Within said section, it has been 
established how Trump discursively constructs himself to be the answer to the problems. 
Exactly this process of establishing himself as the answer to the broken system, is highly 
influenced by the utilisation of inductive inferences in the discourse comprehension of the 
message.  
In the earlier validation of the premise of the deductive inference, Trump discursively 
constructs a relation to the professional politician as being inadequate in governing the 
country. This validation opens the way for a specific transfer of power. This power 
transfer refers to the process within the announcement speech where Trump continually 
aims at creating a link between himself, as a successful business owner, to what is 
discursively represented to constitute an ideal leader of America. This specific transfer 
refers to the aforementioned utilisation of inductive inferences since Trump discursively 
construct himself as the solution to the problems he has presented. By firstly validating 
the premise of the deductive inference through the discursive construction of a specific 
narrative of problematization, Trump makes it possible to include an inductive inference, 
where he positions himself as the direct solution. The American people know he is a great 
businessman, and the ideal leader of America is a personification of an individual that can 
do business, therefore Trump is the logical choice. Inductive inferences utilise the 
audiences logical understanding of a given statement or phenomenon based on their 
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contextual and historical discourse comprehension; therefore, something is discursively 
understood to work again, if it has been working before (Singer & Lea 2012). 
Through the construction of inductive inferences Trump makes the solution to the 
problems evident. He has discursively validated the existence of said problems, and 
through the combination of the inductive inferences and the discursive validation, he 
represents a personification of the ideal leader. This is due to him living up to the 
standards that are evident within the three main discourses; 
1) The Establishment is to blame for all problems in the US. 
• Trump is a good negotiator, a brilliant and successful businessman, 
and he therefore inherits the criteria needed to secure American 
values. 
2) American inferiority within the international field of competition is blamed on 
foreign threats.  
• Through his skillset Trump can once again secure American superiority 
on the international scene. 
3) The poor economy, exemplified in the lack of jobs, is the symptom of a 
political system brought to its knees by incompetent politicians and foreign 
threats.  
• His reputation of creating jobs in the private sector, and his constant 
goal of progress that meets the measures of a fixed understanding of 
neoliberalism will upgrade the public sector. 
By implementing the theoretical foundation offered by cognitive pragmatics, a link 
between the individual and complementary factors, enabling a specific discourse 
comprehension has been explored. This link makes it possible to process the 
complementary triadic construction of discourses, revolving around the problematization 
of general issues in the US, relating to the utilisation of deductive inferences within the 
slogan itself. This deductive inference validates the premise of the slogan which, in this 
case, legitimises the need for an alternative political candidate. A candidate who is not 
influenced by donors, who keeps the people’s interests above all else, and who will 
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restore America to its former greatness through his work as a businessman - inductively 
validated by his history of success and progress. Therefore, the theoretical use of 
cognitive pragmatics has made it possible to investigate how the construction of 
discourses, within the announcement speech, all act as supporting and complementary 
features in the validation of the existence of the slogan as a whole. The discourse 
comprehension of the slogan itself therefore rests upon a foundation offered by texts 
such as the announcement speech, and without this, the slogan arguably cannot 
communicate the message as intended. This allows us to draw the conclusion that the 
narrative of the speech is directly embedded into the slogan. 
 
Contextualising the speech 
Blaming the Other 
The analysis of the thematic category ‘President Trump’ has revealed how Trump 
discursively positions himself as the solution to a variety of problems. The way he 
problematizes the threats facing the US are tied down to his construction of the Other. 
Trump creates two distinct Others; namely the incompetent politicians and leaders of the 
US political establishment, and the foreign threats exemplified as foreign countries and 
enemies of the US. His othering of the establishment falls right into place with the idea 
that populism essentially rests on public discontent with contemporary politics (Wodak 
2015). This discursive distancing from the two constructions of the Other, makes it 
possible for Trump to let the audience point out exactly who is to blame.  
Throughout the analysis of the thematic category ‘Foreign Threats’, we have established 
how Trump utilises xenophobic statements to create a discursive barrier between the US 
citizens and the threats from afar. Furthermore, the analysis of the thematic category 
‘President Trump’ has made it evident how he uses the discourse of exceptionalism to 
distance himself from the Other, in this case referring to the incompetent leadership. This 
constant distinction between ideal and bad politicians point toward an underlying 
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presence of the discourse of indigeneity. This discourse of indigeneity entails that an 
individual is indigenously inherent to certain rights because it meets the standards of 
exceptionalism. Therefore, the relation between the Other, expressed through the 
xenophobic statements, and the ideal politician constructed through the discourse of 
exceptionalism, makes it possible to argue for the existence of the discourse of 
indigeneity. The presence of the three discourses makes it possible to prove that our 
initial hypothesis is present within the announcement speech; Donald Trump is 
constructing the Other as the scapegoat of the downfall of America. 
We argue that Trump indeed discursively presents not only one, but two distinct varieties 
of the Other. These two presentations act as discursive points of reference for the 
audience, since Trump makes it possible to locate the origin of the problems in the US. 
Therefore, the two Others serve as discursive tools, arguably implemented with the aim of 
serving as a scapegoat for the problems in the US - by this he makes it possible to direct 
attention away from the American people’s own fault in the matter. Furthermore, the use 
of scapegoating makes it possible to leave out a problematization of the system in which 
they arose.  
Trumps xenophobic utterances and discursive distancing from the Other, is highly visible 
in the way he addresses minorities when speaking. Whenever he mentions an ethnic or 
religious minority in his speeches, he uses the definite article ‘the’ to describe them as a 
group, as in “the blacks”, “the Muslims, and “the Hispanics”. Thereby, he effectively talks 
about all Muslims, Hispanics, or blacks at the same time, without taking into account any 
form of variation found within the minority. Whether he is blaming them for the problems 
of America or claiming he loves them, what he is doing is prejudiced (Link 23). 
 
Leadership and foreign threats 
Historically, US politics, and Republican politics in particular, has built its foreign policy 
on having to protect against an enemy. This goes back all the way to the isolationist 
policy prior to World War I, and was lately evident in the George W. Bush administration 
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(Kerr 2008). It has further been argued that the republican party is not doing as well when 
foreign policy is not on the agenda (Kerr 2008) – a foreign threat or enemy is a must for a 
successful republican presidential candidate. This is further evident in Ronald Reagan’s 
classic ’Evil Empire’ speech where Reagan distances ‘the people’ – the people of the US 
– from the ‘Evil Empire’ – the Soviet Union (da Nobrega 2013). Kerr (2008) further argues 
that it is evident that the permanent emergency paradigm (Agamben in Kerr 2008) exists 
in contemporary US politics. This is arguably why Trump, a Republican presidential 
candidate, even though he is blaming the entire political establishment, including the 
Republicans, is creating several foreign enemies. The multiplicity of foreign threats acts 
as evidence that the globalised world entails multiple enemies; ISIS, Mexico and China 
are the prevalent ones throughout the speech. There is no longer any one enemy or evil 
empire which America must measure itself against. This context is important to 
understand why Trump utilises the tool of foreign threats. It is also evidence of nationalist 
and thus right-wing populist discourse (Wodak 2015). 
Trump’s lead in the Republican race to the candidacy has created reactions all over the 
world, for example in the United Kingdom where Prime Minister David Cameron has 
stated that Trump’s planned ban on Muslims is; “(...) stupid, divisive and wrong” (Link 24), 
and the newly elected, and first ever Muslim, London mayor Sadiq Khan called Trump’s 
views on Muslims “ignorant” (Link 24). To Cameron’s reaction, Trump responded on 16 
May 2016; “It looks like we’re not going to have a very good relationship”, and continued; 
“Number one, I’m not stupid, I can tell you that right now, just the opposite. I don’t think 
I’m a divisive person, I’m a unifier, unlike our president now.” (Link 25). His critique of the 
current establishment and president is a frequent populist tool (Wodak 2015). To Kahn’s 
comment, Trump stated; “(...) tell him I will remember those statements” (Link 25). 
Trump’s reactions follow the foreign enemy discourse which we have revealed in his 
announcement speech. The distancing between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is a rhetorical tool, often 
used in populist discourse (Wodak 2015).  
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Trump and right-wing populism 
Populism has been described as public discontent with current politics, which aligns with 
the recurring critique of the establishment found in the speech. This has often created a 
difficult balance for populist leaders between the anti-establishment tendencies and the 
proclaimed need for authoritative leadership. The same double standard can be found in 
Trump’s case, who repeatedly criticises the establishment at the same time as presenting 
himself as the best option to lead the country.  
One of the most characteristic features of right-wing populism is a ‘politics of fear’ 
(Wodak 2015), where scapegoating and blaming are heavily used to create a clear 
‘us’/’them’ relation. Where ‘us’ is characterized as ‘the pure people’ or simply ‘the 
people’, it works as an appeal to the common man as opposed to ‘the corrupt elite’. 
According to the populists, the common man’s will should be the driving force for a good 
democracy. The Other, often referred to as ‘them’, can be any group or entity. However, 
the othering has shifted historically, and is now primarily defined as foreign threats from 
abroad. The Other becomes the victim of scapegoating and stereotyping, which is often 
part of a manipulative function. The purpose of these images of the enemy is to create 
fear through an exclusionary rhetoric, formulated by the populist leader (Wodak 2015). 
Through our analysis we have found the same traces in Trump’s rhetoric, where several 
minorities, as well as political parties, the establishment and foreign countries are directly 
and indirectly blamed for America’s problems. His choice of words and themes create 
distinct blaming and works as a ‘politics of fear’. 
Despite, or maybe even because of the anti-intellectual rhetoric and the often very 
simplistic solutions, the nationalist and populist leader is generally legitimised and 
presented as a saviour of ‘the people’ (Wodak 2015). We have found this same 
characteristic in Trump, who offers overly uncomplicated solutions to highly complex 
problems concerning economy and national security.  
A perfect example of Trumps populist agenda is found in his utterances on immigration. 
On December 7th 2015, Trump read a statement from his campaign calling for; “(...) a total 
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and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” (Link 24). Through this 
xenophobic statement, he blames the current leaders of the country for the necessity of 
the ban, claiming that; “We have no choice” (Link 24). This follows the populist rhetoric 
we have found throughout the announcement speech, where he criticises the 
establishment (Wodak 2015). In the same statement he addresses the “hatred” (Link 24), 
which is only getting worse and will lead to “(...) more World Trade Centers” (Link 24). 
Trump is playing with both scapegoating, ‘us’/’them’, and fear, as well as anti-intellectual 
populist rhetoric in the shape of overly simplistic solutions to a complex security problem. 
The discourse of xenophobia is arguably a naturalised one, when 51% of Americans, 
according to some polls, agree with the above (Link 25). 
 
Trump and neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is extremely difficult to define as a single ideology (Preston & Silke 2011 
and Springer 2012). However, as we have argued above, Trump makes use of neoliberal 
discourse throughout his speech. On several occasions he criticises the political 
establishment and system which indicates the neoliberal discourse (Preston & Silke 
2011). In accordance with the thoughts that citizens possess equal opportunity for 
success, the responsibility for obtaining it lies entirely with the individual. This 
responsibility is a key concept and the discourse is that success is achieved through 
entrepreneurship and hard work (Preston & Silke 2011). This line of thought means that 
the elite is admired and at the same time represents a desirable and obtainable goal, 
resulting in elitism (Preston & Silke 2011). Trump represents an example of such an 
achievement, according to himself. He tells the story of starting up small with his father 
and his ventures into the ‘big leagues’ that have made him the real estate billionaire he is 
today. Throughout his speech, he makes the clear point that he is a self-made man and 
underlines the pride he takes in his extravagant wealth, in perfect accordance with the 
individualist discourse.  
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Another common discourse is found when talking about ‘bad apples’. Any problems 
within the capitalist system can be traced back to the unlawful and unethical actions of 
individuals rather than to a structuralist problem with the very foundation of capitalism, 
thereby avoiding criticism of the system and rather of good or bad capitalists (Preston & 
Silke 2011). An example of this can be found in the way Trump is representing what he 
refers to as ‘these people’, ‘the politicians’ or just ‘them’. As stated earlier in the analysis 
Trump refers to this group of individuals as ‘stupid’ and places a great deal of the blame 
with them, as they are the ones failing to deal with the threats and problems facing the 
US, he even calls them ‘morally corrupt’ (Appendix A, 12:9). Trump uses a metaphor to 
perfectly summarize the point that the problem is not with the capitalist structure, but 
rather with the leaders in the following quote; 
“We have all the cards, but we don’t know how to use them. We don’t even know that 
we have the cards, because our leaders don’t understand the game”. 
(Appendix A, 6:30) 
The system is clearly not at fault, as the US hold all the cards necessary to winning the 
game, it is the incompetence of the players, i.e. the politicians, that is to blame for their 
losses.  
The neoliberal discourse which saturates the speech can arguably be determined as the 
third understanding of neoliberalism as state form (Springer 2012), which focuses on 
transnational economic competition. On his own website, Trump states that he will 
implement a tax reform to; “Grow the American economy by discouraging corporate 
inversions, adding a huge number of new jobs, and making America globally competitive 
again” (Link 26). We argue that this plan reveals a neoliberalist set of values. According to 
Preston and Silke (2012), neoliberalist policy views the state as an instance that should 
not be redistributive in a social democratic sense. This counts state regulatory policies or 
programmes such as permanent employment or wage rates, where the state is seen to 
‘interfere’ with the market. Instead the state is supposed to interfere in a sense where it 
either defends or creates markets. The role of the state is therefore; 
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“(...) to keep the market competition from either collective interests of monopolization, 
in that sense the neo-liberal state is regulatory. That is to say nothing of protecting 
private property (and private markets) by force if necessary, up to and including from 
the state itself (through taxation)”. 
(Preston & Silke, 2011: 56)  
This supports our analytical claim that Trump constructs his narrative based on neoliberal 
values, where conditions of the free market is highly prioritised.  
A common perception of neoliberal discourses describes a simultaneous anti-political 
and anti-state orientation. This orientation is derived from the idea that the state is best 
governed under the rule of experts rather than by those who have to answer to the 
democratic system. This strong distinction between two ideological ideals of governance 
is highly linked to the thoughts of elitism, in which it is discussed how the aforementioned 
experts are capable of assuring the intended standards of the state (Preston & Silke 
2011). This neoliberal discourse is evident throughout the category of foreign threats. This 
is also visible through his heavy use of xenophobic utterances and statements on 
immigration issues (Springer 2012). This is not to say he is then an ultra-neoliberalist, in 
fact, our findings seem to point towards Trump embracing both right-wing populist and 
neoliberal discourse simultaneously.  
 
Trump, the fascist? 
Trump is paradoxically embracing and blaming the globalisation and foreign threats at the 
same time. He is arguably right in doing so, since the globalisation entails that capital is 
concentrated among few large transnational corporations, and according to Lynn (in 
Woodley 2013) the Western middle class is the one at risk of losing economic liberty and 
security in this globalised neoliberal world (Woodley, 2013). 
So which tools are Trump using to further his neoliberal values? He is arguably using 
nationalist and populist discourses when addressing the issue of foreign threats. Again 
  
46 
Woodley (2013) argues that it is important to note that nationalism, is absolutely 
compatible with neoliberalism. Thus, through the use of neoliberal values and discourse 
Trump targets what Czech philosopher Slavoj Žižek would call the Western middle class 
(Woodley 2013). When Trump uses the term ’we the people’ he is deliberately creating a 
nationalist and right-wing populist understanding of ‘us’ as part of the same unity (Wodak 
2015), not separated in classes and not as individuals. According to Woodley (2013) that 
is a clear distinction of right-wing populists. When Trump mobilizes the populist right 
through his speech, it furthermore acts as a neutraliser towards the counter hegemonic 
discourses created by the left (which could be exemplified in Bernie Sanders). This in turn 
reasserts the ‘universal’ capitalist and neoliberalist values as hegemonic values. 
We can thus argue that Trump is combining the forces of nationalist and neoliberal 
discourses to create his narrative. This is emphasized by him blaming the Other. In both 
cases, the political establishment and the foreign threats are constructed as the 
dangerous Other. He is arguably contradicting himself when he both praises and blames 
China and Mexico. Another point which Woodley (2013) emphasises regarding right-wing 
populism;  
“Right-wing populism is conservative in defence of identity but radical in defence of 
economic freedom, defending structured inequality and culturally specific distributions 
of powering a ‘fortress state’ closed to multiculturalism”. 
(Woodley 2013: 36) 
This is arguably what Trump does throughout the announcement speech. He is defending 
the national identity of ‘the people’ but is doing it with a neoliberal discourse. If we follow 
the argument through, we see that Trump, through his announcement speech, can be 
placed in what Woodley (2013) calls the nexus between neoconservatism and 
neoliberalism, which is constitutive of fascism.  
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Militarism and violence 
According to Machin & Richardson (2012) fascist music and songs were often utilised in 
European fascist regimes. Themes such as militarism is often connected to fascism. This 
theme can be found at a Trump rally in Pensacola, Florida on January 13th 2016, where 
both nationalism and militarism is heavily embedded in the singing (Link 27), a quick 
semiotic and discourse analysis reveals that the themes are very evident in the text; 
“Enemies of freedom / Face the music / Come on, boys—take ‘em down!” (Link 28). 
Nationalistic tendencies can further be found in the lyrics; “The stars and stripes are flying 
/ Let’s celebrate our freedom / Inspire, proudly, freedom to the world” (Link 28). This all 
supports the argument, that Trump is embedding fascist discourses in his slogan. 
At a Republican presidential debate on March 3rd 2016, Trump openly defended using 
waterboarding and torture, stating; “I would bring back waterboarding, and I would bring 
back things a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding” (Link 29). Again, we find militarism, 
as well as violent discourses, which is often found in fascist discourse (Santiáñez 2013; 
Machin & Richardson 2012). Referring to “(...) these animals over in the Middle East” (Link 
28), Trump is dehumanising the people, and thereby stressing the ‘us’/’them’ relation 
(Wodak 2015). Furthermore, he defends killing terrorists and their families, and states that 
the military would not refuse his orders (Link 29). He later withdrew this statement, 
referring to international laws concerning war crimes (Link 29). However, we find clear 
dominant, superior discourses, stressing inequality and xenophobia (Dyer & Wankah 
2012). 
We furthermore argue, that Trump is a demagogue, based on his tendencies to turn the 
population against itself, often by anti-intellectual methods such as violence (Wodak 
2015) (Link 30). At several of his campaign rallies, Trump has directly encouraged his 
audience to use violence against protesters;  
“If you see somebody getting ready to throw a tomato, knock the crap out of them, 
would you? Seriously. Okay? Just knock the hell - I promise you, I will pay for the legal 
fees”. 
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 (Link 31) 
By justifying violence as a response to legal protesting, he is aiming at people’s anger 
and turning it towards his rivals. Populists often aim at creating a movement; to gather 
the people in a shared fight for change (Berlet & Lyons 2000). When Trump is referring to 
his campaign as a movement, he is likely to create an empowering and unifying effect on 
the voters. Additionally, he stated at another rally, in a similar situation, that; “(...) in the 
good old days this didn’t used to happen, because they used to treat them very rough” 
(Link 31). This is a direct parallel to his slogan Make America Great Again, where he 
praises the past and clearly divides it from the present. Positioning the past on a pedestal 
is a common populist feature which aims at the population’s dissatisfaction with the 
current status quo and their wish for change (Berlet & Lyons 2000). 
 
Conclusive thoughts 
We set out to investigate how the slogan Make America Great Again was constructed 
throughout the announcement speech of Donald Trump. Through our analyses we have 
denaturalised discourses of xenophobia, indigeneity and exceptionalism within the 
announcement speech, and arguably, through the use of linguistic inference, thus the 
slogan (Singer & Lea 2012). These discourses in combination, lead us to conclude that 
Trump is using scapegoating as a major part of his rhetoric (Dyer & Wankah 2012). The 
use of scapegoating leads us to suggest that the slogan is built on the pillars of right-wing 
populist discourses, amongst others. The use of nationalist, anti-establishment and 
exclusionary rhetoric, all support this argument according to Wodak (2015). It seems that 
Trump has managed to combine traditional conservative republican foreign-policy-
rhetoric, creating one or several foreign enemies (Kerr 2008), with the use of right-wing 
populist scapegoating and critique of the political establishment. To say the least, it is 
very intriguing that the use of right-wing populist discourse is now visible in US politics, 
as it is traditionally located in Europe (Wodak & Richardson 2013), and it will be very 
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important to follow this development throughout the general election and even further, 
should Trump win. As critical discourse analysts, it is our primary concern to shed light on 
the use of these discourses and the construction of power relations created therefrom.  
Our findings furthermore, and very curiously, reveal the use of a neoliberal discourse, 
underlying the entire speech and thus plays a major role in the construction of the slogan. 
It has become evident that blaming and criticising the political establishment of the US is 
a recurring theme of Trump’s announcement speech. The discourse of the establishment 
being at fault for the issues of the US, is massively embedded in the slogan and it is not 
only a right-wing populist rhetoric but a vast part of neoliberal discourse as well (Preston 
& Silke 2011). Moreover, the focus on transnational economic competition supports the 
argument that neoliberalist values are a big part of Trump’s narrative (Springer 2012). By 
using a neoliberalist set of values Trump is legitimising the need for him to become 
commander in chief. On one side America needs a financial expert like Trump to lead 
them out of the crisis created by the Other. On the other side Trump, being a part of ‘the 
people’, is constantly criticising the establishment for not concentrating on the people’s 
needs. 
We argue that the narrative of the announcement speech, and thus the slogan, is built 
through the combination of right-wing populist and neoliberal discourse. And this in turn, 
is what Woodley (2013) names the nexus of neoconservatism and neoliberalism, which is 
constitutive of fascism. It is important to mention here, that we are not calling Trump a 
fascist, however, we are arguing that Trump’s slogan; Make America Great Again is 
constructed through the use of, among other, traditional fascist rhetorical tools. Based on 
our research we are not able define Trump as a fascist or neo-fascist. We refrain from any 
such definition and refer to the generic term used by Wodak & Richardson (2013). 
However, we have offered a critical insight into the tools utilised by Trump when creating 
his slogan, and hope to spread this knowledge in order to, perhaps, assist in further 
studies of similar micro events.  
We are therefore able to conclude that the narrative which Trump discursively constructs 
within the micro event of the announcement speech, is embedded with a general fascist 
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rhetoric. We argue that the denaturalisation of the ideology is highly relevant for the 
audience, as a paradox arises of Trump being elitist and populist at the same time. 
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